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Abstract 
The organism is neither a discovery like the circulation of the blood or the glycogenic function 
of the liver, nor a particular biological theory like epigenesis or preformationism. It is rather a 
concept which plays a series of roles – sometimes overt, sometimes masked – throughout the 
history of biology, and frequently in very normative ways, also shifting between the biological 
and the social. Indeed, it has often been presented as a key-concept in life science and the 
‘theorization’ of Life, but conversely has also been the target of influential rejections: as just an 
instrument of transmission for the selfish gene, but also, historiographically, as part of an 
outdated ‘vitalism’. Indeed, the organism, perhaps because it is experientially closer to the 
‘body’ than to the ‘molecule’, is often the object of quasi-affective theoretical investments 
presenting it as essential, sometimes even as the pivot of a science or a particular approach to 
nature, while other approaches reject or attack it with equal force, assimilating it to a 
mysterious ‘vitalist’ ontology of extra-causal forces, or other pseudo-scientific doctrines. This 
paper does not seek to adjudicate between these debates, either in terms of scientific validity 
or historical coherence; nor does it return to the well-studied issue of the organism-mechanism 
tension in biology. Recent scholarship has begun to focus on the emergence and transformation 
of the concept of organism, but has not emphasized so much the way in which organism is a 
shifting, ‘go-between’ concept – invoked as ‘natural’ by some thinkers to justify their 
metaphysics, but then presented as value-laden by others, over and against the natural world. 
The organism as go-between concept is also a hybrid, a boundary concept or an epistemic limit 
case, all of which partly overlap with the idea of ‘nomadic concepts’. Thereby the concept of 
organism continues to function in different contexts – as a heuristic, an explanatory challenge, 
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a model of order, of regulation, etc. – despite having frequently been pronounced irrelevant 
and reduced to molecules or genes. Yet this perpetuation is far removed from any ‘metaphysics 
of organism’, or organismic biology. 
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 Introduction 
The organism is neither a discovery like the circulation of the blood or the glycogenic function 
of the liver, nor a particular biological theory like epigenesis or preformationism. It is rather a 
concept which plays a series of roles – sometimes overt, sometimes masked – throughout the 
history of biology, and frequently in very ‘valuative’ or normative ways, also shifting between 
the biological and the social (Canguilhem, 2002, Gissis, 2009). Indeed, it has often been 
presented as a key-concept in life science and the ‘theorization’ of Life (for instance, in the 
sense that biology is a science of organisms or is nothing; Grene and Depew, 2004). Similarly, at 
a more conceptual level, perhaps because it is experientially closer to the ‘body’ than to the 
‘molecule’, the organism is often the object of quasi-affective theoretical investments 
presenting it as essential, perhaps even as the pivot of a science or a particular approach to 
nature (from Hegel onwards, and explicitly with thinkers such as Kurt Goldstein and, with more 
metaphysical investment, Hans Jonas; see Wolfe, 2004, 2010). Conversely, it has also been the 
target of some influential rejections, classically in Dawkins’ vision of the organism as just an 
instrument of transmission for the selfish gene (Dawkins, 1976), but also, at a historiographic 
level, as a denunciation of ‘vitalism’ in the history of science (Schiller, 1978) or, as Laublicher 
has noted, in the kinds of attacks that go beyond scientific claims and counter-claims 
(Laubichler, 2000), assimilating its concept to a mysterious ‘vitalist’ ontology of non-causal 
forces, or some other ‘pre’- or ‘pseudo’-scientific doctrine; or at least, “a highly contestable 
notion” (Sterelny and Griffiths, 1999, p. 173). Biologists of a reductionist persuasion will target 
any notion of a ‘force’, ‘principle’ or other transcendent ground which causes physical and 
chemical processes in the body while itself being extra-causal, uncaused, immaterial. 
Here, I do not seek to adjudicate between these debates, either in terms of scientific 
validity or historical coherence; nor do I return to the classic issue of the organism-mechanism 
tension which has particularly been studied in late nineteenth and early twentieth-century 
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biology (Hein, 1972, Allen, 2005). It has been observed that we have numerous histories of 
genetics, but no history of organism (Laubichler, 2000). We have studies of the emergence and 
displacements of the term (Cheung, 2006) but not of the shifts in concepts of organism as parts 
or foundations of a science (Peterson, 2010 is a step in this direction, for twentieth-century 
organicism). Recent scholarship has begun to focus on the transformation of the concept of 
organism (Huneman and Wolfe eds., 2010), but there is an aspect that has not been 
emphasized so much (except perhaps under the heading of ‘metaphors of organism’ in 
Schlanger, 1971): the way in which organism is a shifting, ‘go-between’ concept – invoked as 
‘natural’ by some thinkers to justify their metaphysics, but then presented as value-laden by 
others over and against the natural world. It can also be described as a hybrid (sometimes 
expressing a kind of complex mechanistic view, sometimes a foundational subjectivity), a 
“boundary concept” or “trading zone” (Star and Griesemer, 1989, Galison, 1999). The organism 
concept also often deliberately shifts, whether we call this a nomadic concept or, in my terms, 
an ontological go-between, between metaphysical and empirical levels of discussion – 
something that both metaphysicians and historians of biology often miss sight of. 
Which hybridity is at issue, and what do I understand by the organism as ontological go-
between? One might think that the former refers to the diversity of its meanings, uses, 
metaphors and reference points. And indeed, diversity, metaphor and reference all have a 
distinguished pedigree in our efforts at conceptualizing the history of science. Evelyn Fox Keller 
has emphasized (with reference to Max Black) that metaphor “can serve important positive 
functions in scientific explanations” (Keller, 2003, p. 118). She uses the language of 
productivity: “metaphoric utterances can be scientifically productive just because they open up 
new perspectives on phenomena that are still obscure and ill-defined and about which 
clarification is achieved only through a process of groping—in other words, on the kinds of 
phenomena that scientists take as the objects of their investigations” (ibid.). Yet it is not 
enough to insist on the presence of metaphors in scientific cognition. Precisely as regards the 
productivity of concepts such as organism, we need to add at least two further dimensions to 
Fox Keller’s defense of the role of metaphors. A useful further suggestion is Mieke Bal’s, that 
concepts are “tools of intersubjectivity” (Bal, 2002, p. 22); they do more than metaphors, 
because “they offer miniature theories, and in that guise, help in the analysis of objects, 
situations, states and other theories” (ibid.). 
But if we were to follow this line of thought, we would be completely blind to the 
polemical dimension of the organism concept: it is much less about consensus and more about 
trying to insist on something missing from scientific practice. In addition, neither the insistence 
on the positive role of metaphors in science, nor the focus on “travelling concepts” can yield 
any sense of the problem of the organism’s ontological status, whether in the traditional sense 
of the organism as biological individual, or the sense of organism as ontological go-between. To 
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be fair, Bal seems to identify some aspect of the latter when she speaks of the “propagation of 
a concept that emerges in one field, in another field that changes its meaning and whose 
meaning it, in turn, changes, constitutes the primary feature of a concept, both as asset and 
liability, or risk” (Bal, 2002, p. 32). Yet propagation is still not enough. Because part of the ‘go-
between’ quality I would like to bring out in what follows, leads us to ask: is the variety of 
meanings and references of ‘organism’ an epistemic issue? A confirmation that we should be 
content to be instrumentalists in science and not ascribe any innate reality to the entities under 
discussion? And if, in contrast, it enters into ontology, in what sense? I will suggest that we 
need to include under the heading of the organism’s ontological status, both some of its 
conceptual productivity via its hybridity, and its historical diversity (which typically would serve 
as an excuse for the instrumentalist to ignore or bracket off ontological considerations). It is a 
“limit case,” not per se an object of inquiry “in the day-to-day operations of the scientist in the 
laboratory,” but rather the reflection, “sometimes quite philosophical, regarding scientific 
issues that do not adhere to the usual stipulations of empirical warrant. Yet they are issues 
which scientists feel compelled to make pronouncements regarding them” (Peterson, 2012). 
Indeed, Peterson mentions, in addition to matter itself, and human cognition, the nature of 
organisms as one of these limit cases. The concept of organism is never pure or analytically 
unresolvable. It is always partly constructed or modified or borrowed from elsewhere, including 
when its asserted in its valuative terms, over and against ‘mechanistic science’, or ‘atomism’, 
‘reductionism’ and other equally elastic and often ideological categories. It shifts between 
realms, but it is also a hybrid in esse. 
 
1. 
The hybridity of the concept of organism, which functions alternatively as a polemical 
concept, a model of order or of regulation, an explanatory challenge, and more broadly, as 
what I’ll call an ontological go-between, can serve as a defense of the concept, by showing that 
it continues to be productive, as a heuristic, but also precisely as something other than a 
construct or metaphor, in different contexts despite having frequently been pronounced 
‘caduc’, irrelevant, reduced to molecules or genes. Yet this perpetuation is far removed from 
any ‘metaphysics of organism’, or organismic biology. Again, what is perpetuated is not a 
monolithic, unresolvable or metaphysically foundational individual (the organism as person, 
one is tempted to say) but a shifting entity. Go-betweenness as understood here is, as Bal says 
of her “travelling concepts,” an “asset rather than a liability” (Bal, 2002, p. 25). 
 In earlier work on the concept of organism I first made a case for an instrumentalist 
concept (Wolfe, 2004), which would dissolve ontological debates between reductionist and 
heavily organismic approaches to the nature or individuality of living beings; more recently 
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(Wolfe, 2010) I argued for a weakly ontological view in which organizational concepts, whether 
primarily structural (the ‘animal economy’ in Montpellier vitalism) or also homeostatic (as in 
Claude Bernard and more recently, Alvaro Moreno and William Bechtel’s discussion of 
organizational closure in biological systems), were the ‘realest’ yet also least ideological 
concept of organism. While I return to what I’ll call ‘weak organicism’ in the last sections of this 
essay, I will be more interested here in these reality claims as part of a broader phenomenon of 
hybridity, borrowing, transplantation and displacement. In this sense, my approach to 
‘organism’ here treats it less like an absolute, irreducible and trans-historical concept, and more 
like a varying, plural historical concept but also, a construct with varying degrees of heuristic 
utility, in that sense closer to ‘mechanism’ as understood in recent discussions which move 
away from mechanistic ontology and towards issues such as ‘what can mechanisms do?’. 
Indeed, one can ask the question of the very existence of the organism, as the journal 
American Zoologist did a few decades ago – one article in this issue is entitled “Do organisms 
exist?”, Ruse, 1989), or as philosophers and theoretical biologists have more recently (Wolfe, 
2004, Cheung, 2006, Huneman and Wolfe, eds., 2010, Toepfer, 2013). This ontological question 
– does the organism exist or not? or is it just an artefact, an effect or quasi-anthropomorphic 
projection of the human mind? – derives from the frequent judgment in molecular biology, 
according to which biology progresses by ‘molecularization’ (Morange, 1997), which should 
lead to the disappearance of ‘older’ concepts such as organism. In reaction, it is often 
suggested that such concepts have a purely instrumental status, as more or less useful 
constructs which can be discarded as science progresses. The instrumentalist could say of the 
organism what Buffon said famously of species, that it is not a natural kind but a ‘constructed’ 
category, an “abstract,” “general” and temporary construct of the mind, or “vue de l’esprit”1: a 
projection onto the world which enables us to grasp it otherwise than as a heap of dead matter 
or a chaos of atoms in motion; in other words, a heuristic construct. Yet I will treat 
instrumentalism rather differently here: in less deflationary terms, because I present the 
historicity of the concept – the historical diversity of organism concepts – as part of the reality 
of the concept. Paradoxically, this historicization of instrumentalism blurs the instrumentalism / 
realism divide2 – an interesting consequence, but one which then raises the problem of 
reference. 
If I am denying that organism reduces to a random assortment of metaphors, or of 
historically located practices and meanings, which have nothing to do with another, am I then 
                                                             
1 For Buffon, species is not a natural kind but an “abstract,” “general” and temporary construct of the mind (“notre 
ouvrage”) which is the result of comparing individuals to each other (Buffon [1753], “L’âne,” pp. 384-385). His 
successor Lacépède explicitly describes species as a “vue de l’esprit,” a mental construct, in his commentary and 
extension of Buffon’s work (Lacépède [1800], “Sur la durée des espèces,” p. xxxiii). 
2 Thanks to Anya Plutynski for suggesting this point. 
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defending a revised version of the old claim (Depew and Grene, 2004) according to which 
biology is a ‘science of organisms’, and thinkers and biologists from Aristotle to Lamarck, 
Darwin, Claude Bernard, Haldane and Needham worked with ‘organism’ as a referent? If this 
were so, one could claim that diversity of meanings, practices and contexts could be subsumed 
under a theory of reference whereby the term ‘organism’ would “nonetheless refer to the same 
entity across these theories, so that the theories can potentially make conflicting claims about 
this common referent” while being comparable (Brigandt, 2010, p. 20). But precisely in the case 
of ‘organism’, it is at best unclear what that shared referent would be. As Brigandt notes, even 
if a term’s reference is stable across history, its definition may be subject to change (ibid., p. 
20), and here, that kind of stability is not even present. 
I am leaving aside the old Aristotelian question of organisms as individual substances, 
that is, the idea that it is a ‘fact’, either of our intuition or of nature, that organisms, particularly 
mid-size entities, represent paradigms for our idea of individuals; as James Lennox puts it, for 
Aristotle, “paradigm natural substances were not the common material constituents of the 
universe, but the most active, complex and organized of bodies, the living ones” (Lennox, 2001, 
pp. 108-109); recent work in biology challenges some of these intuitions, from the work 
focusing on the role of the bacteria in our gut in maintaining our immunological individuality 
(Pradeu, 2012) to corals and forests (Bouchard, 2006, 2013). These are fascinating questions, 
but belong to a separate, specifically metaphysical dimension of the issue. My aim here is not to 
defend a metaphysical thesis on the nature of biological individuality, or to illustrate its radical 
denial in favor of evolving scientific change (as in Rosenberg’s instrumentalism: Rosenberg, 
1989) in some historical cases, despite how the hybridity described here could sound 
‘instrumentalist’. Rather, I argue for a reality of the organism concept in terms of hybridity and 
productivity, not just as a temporary instrumental construct with no particular content; 
“concepts are not just tools” (Bal, 2002, p. 29). What does it mean to inquire into the reality of 
the organism? 
Significant metaphysical theses that could be used in support of an irreducible organism 
concept include the ‘animalism’ defended by Eric Olson (in which our personal identity is 
defined by our biology in the sense that we are ‘human animals’ more fundamentally than we 
are Lockean psychological persons defined by the continuity of their thoughts, Olson, 1997) and 
the form of Aristotelian substantivalism defended by David Wiggins, which invokes “an 
unmysterious but pre-empiricist notion of substance” (Wiggins, 2001, p. 80). But whether a 
substrate, a total system of interrelations, or some other ‘substance’, these theories are 
competing claims concerning the nature of a real organismic identity. Instead, my analysis 
tends to show how the organism concept is always borrowed from some other realm (from the 
metaphysical to the physical or inversely; or from the physical to the biological, or from the 
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biological to the social), as a go-between, yet a go-between which serves a genuine purpose of 
conceptual articulation. 
Sometimes, our understanding of individuality or identity of organisms is challenged by 
Nature itself, so that we should broaden it (e.g. to the concept of superorganism, including the 
Portuguese man-o-war jellyfish and eusocial insect colonies [Pepper and Heron, 2008, Queller 
and Strassman, 2009, Haber, 2013]) or loosen it, as in Scott Turner’s work on how artificial, 
abiotic structures such as the termite mound (Turner, 2006, Turner, 2007, ch. 2 and Turner, 
2013), and ‘natural’ organisms such as individual termites together form one homeostatic 
entity, serving actual physiological functions including maintenance of temperature and 
respiration. In that sense, to borrow a helpful distinction from Matt Haber, the issue here is less 
‘are organisms paradigmatic individuals?’ and more ‘how could we define a paradigmatic 
organism?’ (Haber, 2013, p. 201), with the proviso that my answer will include its shifting 
character, rather than point to a strict definition. My emphasis on how the concept of organism 
shifts, circulates and is both ‘displacer and displaced’ between different scientific and 
philosophical contexts is, to reiterate, not a defense of organisms as paradigmatic individuals or 
irreducible wholes, nor conversely, does it present organisms as purely metaphors, linguistic 
conventions or façons de parler.3 Qua real, the organism is more a matter of ‘degrees of 
organismality’ (Queller and Strassman, 2009); qua concept, it is both a hybrid (lacking a single 
‘pure’ definition), and a go-between, being perpetually being combined with other concepts – 
from that of soul to that of machine, biochemical process or cybernetic system, from the 
seventeenth to the twentieth centuries). 
 
2. 
From the heyday of psychophysics in the nineteenth century to the triumphant 
reductionist proclamations of biochemists such as Emil Du Bois-Reymond and Jacques Loeb in 
the next generations, for whom life had to be a matter of biochemistry (thus Loeb insisted on 
the unlimited scope of biochemical explanations: “we cannot allow any barrier to stand in the 
path of our complete control and thereby understanding of vital phenomena” [cit. in Allen, 
2005, p. 273; see Loeb, 1964]), we often encounter the assertion that the organism has been 
replaced by molecular explanations. This replacement is not just the ordinary fading away of 
one concept in favor of another. Loeb’s language of barriers is echoed in a contemporary 
                                                             
3 In that sense, my analysis is located halfway between the aforementioned metaphysical perspective (are 
organisms, i.e. biological individuals in this context, real? in what sense? As substance, process, interrelation of 
parts, continuity of consciousness, etc.?) and the study of organisms as metaphors (Schlanger, 1971) or as 
epistemic things (Rheinberger, 1997a). In trying to articulate precisely this ‘between’ conceptual space, I have 
found Brigandt’s analysis of epistemic goals and reference and Bal’s discussion of travelling concepts, useful. 
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statement by D’Arcy Thompson, who criticized Haldane for excessive ontological commitments, 
and insisted implicitly that there is ‘nothing other’ than physical and chemical reactions: “The 
alleged phenomena of self-production, self-maintenance, and self-regulation are the common 
currency of those who, finding the mechanistic theory difficult and unsatisfactory, are content 
to postulate a something ‘which interferes with and guides the physical and chemical 
reactions’” (D’Arcy Thompson, in Haldane, D’Arcy Thompson et al., 1918, p. 12). It is important 
to note, though, that such assertions occur in diverse, not particularly homogeneous scientific 
trajectories: they are not monolithic, nor do they necessarily refer to the same object. 
The properly philosophical analogue of these ‘empirical’ reductionist claims is Ernest 
Nagel’s effort to restate the teleological language of organismic biology in purely mechanistic 
terms (Nagel, 1961). Sometimes this reduction, elimination or otherwise, erasure of organism is 
presented in negative terms (as a loss of meaning, a dehumanization, etc.), but more often it is 
presented as a neutral statement of fact: “both scientists and philosophers take ontological 
reduction for granted… Organisms are ‘nothing but’ atoms, and that is that” (Hull, 1981, p. 
282), or “Organisms have disappeared as the fundamental units of life. In their place we now 
have genes …” (Goodwin 1994, p. 1). Yet such neutral statements sometimes have implicit 
normative content, namely, recommending that we no longer do revisionary metaphysics of 
organism, understood as the project of revising our scientific worldpicture to supplement it 
with something additional (whether this be an ‘entelechy’, as in Driesch, a ‘drive’ as in E.S. 
Russell or an ‘organismic law’ as in Elsasser). 
Historically, we can see this process of demystification at work with the abandonment 
of questions such as ‘What is life?’ as “the practical starting point for physiological research” 
(Coleman, 1977, p. 13), after figures such as Treviranus and Caspar Friedrich Wolff in the early 
nineteenth century. A further step is taken when, despite the presence and even usefulness of 
the (or ‘an’) organism concept in disciplines such as embryology, ethology or evolutionary 
biology (Pepper and Heron, 2008), some researchers in fundamental biology (Di Paolo, 2009) 
end up stating that life itself does not exist. This recalls François Jacob’s famous 
pronouncement that Life is no longer an object of empirical research: “We no longer inquire 
into Life today in laboratories” (“On n’interroge plus la vie aujourd’hui dans les laboratoires”: 
Jacob, 1970, p. 320). More recently, Edouard Machery has argued (Machery, 2012) that we 
should give up seeking to provide definitions of life, as these are either folk concepts, or 
unresolvable with other competing definitions: namely, evolutionists, theoretical biologists, 
self-organization theorists, molecular biochemists and artificial life researchers cannot agree on 
a definition. 
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While Machery’s point is well taken,4 one could observe (a) that there is a reality to 
certain life-concepts – I shall speak instead of forms of organization (Bechtel, 2007, Mossio and 
Moreno, 2010, Moreno and Mossio forthcoming), here, that of organism – and (b) that there is 
a particular productivity of the organism if it is understood as a go-between, not as some 
archaic vital substance or irreducible individuality. To be clear, it is not a matter of deciding 
between ‘real or not real’. There have been dozens of papers and volumes defending the reality 
of organism, often in easily falsifiable ways (whether it is because they rely too much on 
purported empirical irreducibility, like Elsasser’s organismic laws, or because they smuggle in 
too much metaphysics, like Ruyer’s biophilosophy), just as there have been dozens of 
contributions insisting it is ‘dead’, refuted, eliminated, etc. Here, the analysis takes as a core 
‘fact’ that biologists and philosophers are not always referring to the same thing when they 
describe or theorize organism. One possible consequence is that drawn by Machery, with 
reference to the concept of life; another consequence, less eliminativist, is that suggested by 
philosophers of biology but also biologists, that we should allow for more elasticity in our sense 
of what ‘organism’ can refer to, from slime molds to primates, but also from coral reefs to 
symbionts, there are ‘degrees of organismality’ (Bouchard, 2009, 2013; Queller and Strassman, 
2009). That is, instead of an either/or sense in which an organism, a superorganism or a 
collection either is an individual or is not, there is a sense, e.g. an evolutionary sense, in which 
collections can “become individuals” (Bouchard and Huneman, 2013, p. 3). The latter sense 
allows of a more elastic kind of reference, matching up with what I have called the productivity 
of the organism concept: following a suggestion of Evelyn Fox Keller’s (here, regarding the 
concept of gene), “even the absence of a clear and univocal meaning of the very concept of the 
gene—that is, of the basic explanatory unit— can be a positive resource for drawing different 
experimental systems and different research programs into a coherent scientific agenda” 
(Keller, 2003, p. 120). 
The organism as go-between, rather than as a concept with a strict reference, is 
desubstantialized, at least in the sense that it is a non-essentialist, non-foundational concept. A 
substantialized concept of organism can either be based on empirical criteria (self-organization, 
self-regulation, internal cohesion, etc., with various problem cases arising such as reproductive 
potential or fissibility) or on irreducible metaphysical criteria of individuality. Sometimes the 
latter even take on a hypertrophied, dualist form in which the living organism and its 
‘potential’, its activity, are opposed to mechanistic explanations and indeed to a mechanistic 
worldpicture. To cite one example among many, this is the rather fearful, emotional motivation 
of anti-reductionist ‘biophilosophers’ like Raymond Ruyer, who was prominent in post-war 
French thought. Ruyer, in this quite close to a tradition of primarily German Romantic 
                                                             
4 I have offered some criticisms of my own against ‘criteria-based’ theories of organism, which he calls 
‘definitional’, in Wolfe, forthcoming 2014b. 
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biophilosophy, defends an explicitly anti-naturalist concept of organicism: he insists on the non-
spatiality of the organism, its sheer potentiality (Ruyer, 1946, pp. 8, 14, 27, 58, 94), over and 
against the reductionist fate he fears modern science brings with it, of a universe composed of 
inanimate matter, with shocks and displacements explainable exhaustively by the laws of 
mechanics. Against this world, in which the organism is no longer anything more than a 
machine, Ruyer warns: “If you are shocked by what amounts to a generalized ‘theory of 
organism’, . . . you had better see clearly that the choice is between this theory and that of a 
‘generalized molecule’” (Ruyer, 1952, p. 166). What I have called the normative, valuative but 
also the polemical dimension of the concept of organism is prominently on display here. 
So on the one hand, the organism is an oppositional concept, often with polemical 
and/or affective value: it serves to assert one ‘realm’, one ontological or scientific domain over 
and against another (the physical universe as a whole; mechanism; inanimate matter; forms of 
life below the threshold of consciousness – for defenders of the concept of organism, however 
diverse they may be, viz. Walter Elsasser and Hans Jonas share neither a metaphysical nor a 
scientific outlook, do not tend to be interested in ‘microorganisms’ or forms of life such as the 
amoeba or the slime mold (Dictyostelium). Von Uexküll’s tick would be something of a 
counterexample, for it is an empirical case meant to justify a holist theory of organism, in which 
each organism lives in a dynamically constituted Umwelt which is unique to that organism: ticks 
perceive only that which is relevant to them, just as dogs and seahorses do. Organisms on this 
view are “closed unit[s]” (von Uexküll, 2010, p. 42), as are their Umwelten: “Each environment 
forms a self-enclosed unit, which is governed in all its parts by its meaning for the subject” (p. 
144). Von Uexküll’s further holist emphasis is that we should understand the tick, like every 
other organism, as a “subject” rather than as a “machine”: “The biologist . . . takes into account 
that each and every living thing is a subject that lives in its own world, of which it is the center. 
It cannot, therefore, be compared to a machine” (p. 45). Von Uexküll’s tick, like Kurt Goldstein’s 
brain-damaged patients (Noppeney, 2001), is not a model organism but rather a paradigm case 
of organism as an irreducible, individual substance.5  
But on the other hand, organism is a hybrid concept, from its early argumentative usage 
onwards (i.e., as a term of argument, not a casual or obscure term), through its trials and 
tribulations as a key term of biology or a term to be rejected. Namely, one author will use the 
organism concept to give metaphysical grounding to an empirical claim (for example, Kant 
insists that in organisms the “idea of a whole” is present as a “principle of knowledge” [Kant, 
1790, § 65], which is not an empirical feature but a “condition of our understanding of organs 
                                                             
5 Goldstein credits von Uexküll explicitly for this concept. In addition, it is not irrelevant that von Uexküll was one 
of the founders of theoretical biology as a discipline, authoring what is probably the first work to bear that title 
(von Uexküll, 1926). 
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and traits as parts of a single organism” [Huneman 2014; Kant, 1790, § 77])6, while another 
author will insist that it is purely empirical – not to mention further instances of hybridity 
between the biological and the social (e.g. Lamarck as discussed in Gissis, 2009), the biological 
and the neuropsychological, and so on.  
The tension between the metaphysical and the empirical is present in the earliest 
‘conceptual’ usage of the term ‘organism’, in the debate between Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz 
and Georg-Ernest Stahl in the early years of the eighteenth century. This was not its very 
earliest usage, which seems to have been in the fourth edition of John Evelyn’s Sylva, 1706, first 
published in 1664 (Cheung, 2006, p. 322), but rather its usage as a technical term with specific 
conceptual content. One must distinguish this specific ‘conceptual’ usage from other early 
occurrences where the meaning is not yet stabilized or clear, as late as Diderot and 
D’Alembert’s Encyclopédie, where ‘organism’ is used synonymously with ‘mechanism’.7 The 
Leibniz-Stahl debate was based on Leibniz’s reply to Stahl’s Theoria medica vera (1707), and 
their ensuing controversy, the texts of which were published under the title Animadversiones 
circa Assertiones aliquas Theoriae Medicae Verae clarii Stahlii, cum ejusdem Leibnitii ad 
Stahlianas observationes responsionibus or, more unkindly, Negotium otiosum (Huneman and 
Rey, 2007, Duchesneau, 2014).8 In the next sections (3 and 4) I address some particular 
historical cases, from the Leibniz-Stahl debate on the difference between organisms and 
mechanisms to eighteenth-century Montpellier vitalist conceptions of the ‘animal economy’ (an 
organism concept) and Claude Bernard’s concept of organic individuality, in order to further 
illustrate the fruitfulness of this hybrid, non-essential, and perpetually nomadic concept of 
organism. I then contrast this concept with a stronger form of organicism (section 5) before 
concluding. 
 
3. 
While Stahl insists on the ontological uniqueness of organism, Leibniz, for whom 
“everything in nature is to be explained mechanically” (Leibniz, first essay on Stahl, 1708, cited 
from the bilingual edition in Carvallo, 2004, p. 73) and who often explains bodies in terms of 
                                                             
6 But Kant also can emphasize empirical features such as self-organization: “organized beings are beings that self-
organize” (Kant, 1987, § 65). 
7
 In the Encyclopédie articles “Fibre” and “Nutrition” (VI, p. 670; XI, p. 288) the terms “méchanisme” and 
organisme” are used interchangeably, e.g. “the mechanism or organism of nutrition.” There is no article 
“Organism(e)” in the Encyclopédie, contrary to what is asserted in Ibrahim, 1999, p. 652, an otherwise very useful 
study (she refers to Enc. XI, p. 360, which is indeed the beginning of the important “Economie animale” article). 
8
 Leibniz wrote some remarks on the Theoria medica vera in 1709, and had them sent to Stahl. Stahl responded 
some months later, but Leibniz was unconvinced, and reiterated his critique in the 1711 Replicatio ad Stahl 
observationes, to which Stahl replied at even greater length. 
 
12 
 
size, shape and motion, discusses organisms as particular, but special cases of a mechanical 
universe: he calls them “machines of nature,” which he defines as machines in their most 
minute parts (“moindres parties”), contrary to machines created by human artifice (Leibniz, 
1978, IV, p. 482); machines down to infinity, also in the sense that bodies contain seeds which 
can never be destroyed (ibid., p. 475). The term ‘organism’ is often presented as first appearing 
in his New System of Nature, published in 1695 in the Journal des savants, but Leibniz uses it in 
Latin and German as well (and in a short 1686 text entitled “Du rapport général de toutes 
choses,” he speaks of “all the parts of matter” as being “full of organism” (pleines d’organisme): 
# 311 in Leibniz, 1999, p. 1614). But Leibniz primarily uses the term “machines of nature.” In the 
Monadology (§ 64) he presents this terminology as a definition of living bodies. The Leibnizian 
‘organism’, in this sense, is a complex kind of machine: “The organism of a living being 
(organismus viventium) is nothing other than a divine mechanism which is more subtle than an 
ordinary mechanism in the infinity of its subtlety” (Leibniz, 1961, 16, § 13; Leibniz, 1978, I, p. 
15). Leibniz denies any kind of extra-causal influence on bodies of a vital principle that would be 
separate from bodies as a whole, which is precisely what Stahl’s anima is: soul as the motive 
force or controller in the body. 
To be clear, these are not just competing empirical explanations of soul:body or 
whole:parts interaction, both of which would amount to ‘definitions of organism’; they are 
ontologically different. Better put, Leibniz refrains from fully ontologizing the concept of 
organism: “’Organism’ and ‘mechanism’ in Stahl designate two regions of being. Leibniz, on his 
part, hardly says ‘organism’, preferring terms such as ‘organized being’, ‘organized body’ or 
‘organic machine’, because organization is a univocal concept, equally applicable to inanimate 
or artificial beings, and to living beings” (Huneman and Rey, 2007, p. 223). Granted, both 
concepts are opposed to that of ‘machine’, but the mainstream sense of ‘organized body’ or 
‘animal economy’ (Wolfe and Terada, 2008) differs from that of ‘machine’ incrementally rather 
than categorically, whereas for Stahl, organism is something unique within Nature as a whole. 
Leibniz and Stahl in their debate both contribute to our conception of organism, including by 
introducing the term in a recognizable technical sense in which it is opposed (although how 
exactly is precisely something they disagree on) to the idea of a machine, as a special kind of 
unity, composition or ‘whole’.9 Conceptually speaking, the Leibnizian idea that an organism 
differs from a machine in terms of degrees of composition, incrementally, is much closer to the 
current idea of ‘degrees of organismality’ (Queller and Strassman, 2009), in the sense that 
ontological specificity is presented as being on a gradation than a matter of irreducible 
uniqueness. 
                                                             
9 For an excellent general presentation of the ‘machines of nature’ concept in Leibniz, see Fichant, 2003 ; for an 
analysis of Leibniz with a philosophy of biology focus, different from the present one as it focuses on the ‘units of 
selection’ debate, see Nachtomy, Shavit and Smith, 2002. 
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It is not too big a step from this incremental vision of organism as a particular, complex 
arrangement of matter, which we also find in eighteenth-century vitalism, as I discuss below, to 
the project of a science specific to such entities, namely biology (on the shifts involved, both 
terminological, instrumental-material and ontological, see Caron, 1988, McLaughlin, 2002, 
Wolfe, 2011). The term ‘biology’ is generally held to have appeared in the 1790s with Lamarck 
and Treviranus, which would then imply roughly a century’s interval between the first technical 
usage of ‘organism’ and that of ‘biology’, from the early 1700s to the late 1790s. But in fact, 
recent work has shown that ‘biology’ appears as early as 1766 (McLaughlin, 2002), with then a 
terminological fluctuation for some decades (terms such as ‘zoonomy’ being other candidates) 
– which itself reveals a desire to account for a reality, whether we call it a practical and 
instrumental reality, or an ontological state of affairs. 
This runs directly counter to the common view according to which the constitution of 
biology as a science had no relation to questions such as ‘what is Life?’ or ontological concerns 
with the specificity of life (as in Keller, 2003, pp. 15-16). The view I am suggesting, that a 
concern with the nature of the reality of organisms plays a role in the constitution of biology 
(without this having to be a commitment to a strongly ontological view of organisms) is 
apparent, for instance, when Caspar Friedrich Wolff seeks to redefine embryology, precisely in 
this period, he states that one of the main goals of his “theory of generation” is not just to 
defend epigenesis as an account of the formation of the embryo, but also more broadly, to 
define a science of the causes and effects specific to the formation of organisms (“organized 
bodies,” Wolff, 1764/1966, p. 36f.). What is specific to the embryo and more generally the 
organism is the presence of a force Wolff calls vis essentialis. 
The oppositional motivation in these classic modern concepts of organism, from Stahl to 
Wolff and beyond, is to produce a model of life which is non-mechanical, or not fully 
mechanical. One can describe them as ‘holistic’, to use an early-twentieth century term – 
although curiously, holism, which is associated with systems theory, is not a doctrine 
specifically about living beings, contrary to a widespread misconception (Wolfe, 2010). For 
example, the founder of systems biology, Ludwig von Bertalanffy, invokes holism as a total 
systemic standpoint with no reference to any special status of living entities, even though in the 
same text he also claims that this standpoint sheds particular light on embryology and how 
organisms are not mere machines, notably due to their teleological and ‘historical’ character 
(von Bertalanffy, 1934, pp. 9, 33, 52). 
For the holist, the difference between an organism – a flesh-and-blood creature which 
falls ill, resists the challenges of its environment and conversely, assimilates the substances that 
will enable it to survive – and a machine, is a difference between two types of ‘whole’ (as is 
often mentioned, ‘holism’ comes from the Greek holos, ‘whole’). If a living whole is greater than 
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the sum of its parts, or conversely, in Aristotle’s example, if a hand cut off from the body is no 
longer a hand,10 in what Deborah Modrak has described as a normative usage of the natural 
function of an organ (Modrak, 1996, p. 158), by contrast, the inert or passive whole of a 
machine is, for Leibniz as for a variety of thinkers he influences, a mere “aggregate” of parts 
(Wolfe, 2006). Holism often, as in the early twentieth-century German Ganzheitsbetrachtung, 
conceives of its object in opposition to ‘mere mechanism’, atomism, reduction, and other 
instances of explanation in terms of decomposition into parts. But the historical reality yields a 
different picture, in which ‘machine’ and ‘organism’ are not independent of one another, such 
that there are mechanist features (if admittedly of a rather pluralistic sort) in most definitions 
of organism. Again, this illustrates both the historical diversity of concepts and contexts of 
organism, and the sense that its ontology would have to be one of degrees, gradations and 
shifts. 
 
4. 
Machine and organism are in interplay here, with the concept of organism being 
articulated, partly (in Leibniz) or wholly (in Stahl), in contradistinction to the concept of 
machine, with at least two different dimensions involved. One is the type of individuality that is 
being argued for: what kind of individual is the organism? Indeed, all or most theories of 
organism attempt to justify the existence of a particular kind of individuality. For Claude 
Bernard, “the physiologist and the physician must never forget that the living being comprises 
an organism and an individuality . . . If we decompose the living organism into its various parts, 
it is only for the sake of experimental analysis, not for them to be understood separately” 
(Bernard, 1865/1984, II, ii, § 1, p. 137). But the other dimension is a kind of hybridity in which 
neither machine nor organism are ‘pure’ or entirely separate from one another (Canguilhem, 
2008). That is, historically, the evidence is in favor of such a status of the organism concept. 
Various examples can be given; those I give below are meant to illustrate the interpenetration 
of machine and organism concepts, or of mechanical and organismic conceptions in an 
interaction. 
In early modern French, words like ‘body’ and ‘machine’ were often defined 
interdependently, e.g. in the Dictionnaire de l’Académie, which defines ‘machine’ in 1694 as “a 
set of parts or organs which form a whole, living or not, and produce determinate effects 
without transmitting a force externally; organism, body” (Cayrou, 1948, s.v. “Machine,” p. 530). 
                                                             
10
 Metaphysics Z 11, 1036b32. The idea is that the material structure of a part per se matters less than ‘where’ it is: 
“blood will not be blood, nor flesh flesh, in any and every state” (Generation of Animals I.18, 722b34); a hand can 
only be understood as a hand inasmuch as it belongs to an ensouled body, i.e., matter animated by a form. 
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By the nineteenth century the situation is different, with the Encyclopédie méthodique 
explaining that one should no longer use the expression “human machine” … but that “animal 
economy” or “organism” are suitable substitutes:  
It is preferable to use the synonymous expressions ‘living economy’, ‘vital 
economy’, ‘animal economy’, ‘organism’, ‘organic mass’, ‘the entire economy of 
the human body’. The term ‘machine’ seems to refer to a system of causes and 
effects which belongs wholly to the mechanistic theory (“Machine,” Vicq d’Azyr, 
ed., 1808, p. 310). 
Yet ‘animal economy’ and ‘organism’ are not being defined here in some kind of deep 
opposition to ‘machine’. Similarly, mechanist concepts of Life and their purportedly opposite 
organicist rivals exist in a historical, conceptual, and instrumental reality which is much more 
hybrid and ‘dialectical’ than their usual, oppositional presentation, in the simple sense that they 
do not function as logical contraries, but as progressive modifications and displacements in the 
project of understanding one and the same object, the living organism (Wolfe, forthcoming 
2014a). In recent discussions of ‘mechanism’, the emphasis is indeed on the role ‘mechanisms’ 
play in biological explanation; but even in classical forms of mechanism (Cartesian, corpuscular, 
or Newtonian-inflected as in Boerhaave) the goal is always to do justice to the target of the 
explanation: the functional properties of living systems. The same applies in a case we have 
been conditioned to think of as an opposite: the first self-described form of vitalism, namely, 
the school of Montpellier vitalists, that is, a group of physicians and professors of medicine 
associated with the Montpellier Medical Faculty, especially in the second half of the eighteenth 
century. The best-known figures here were Paul-Joseph Barthez and Théophile de Bordeu, to 
whom we should add less famous, but equally significant individuals such as Henri Fouquet and 
Jean-Joseph Ménuret de Chambaud (Wolfe and Terada, 2008). 
For present purposes, what is significant about the vitalist approach to the organism 
(which it mainly refers to as “animal economy”) is that it is articulated, not by postulating the 
existence of an invisible vital force, but in structural terms, that is, by describing the functional 
organization of a system of living organs as a kind of extra-complex mechanism with purposive 
properties. In a programmatic article in Diderot and D’Alembert’s Encyclopédie entitled, 
precisely, “Economie Animale,” Ménuret presents those who explain the functioning of the 
living body by the presence of an immaterial soul (i.e., “animists”) and those who reduce the 
body to a mere machine, as equally mistaken: “They did not even pay attention to the organic 
structure of the human body which is the source of its main properties” (Ménuret, 1765, p. 
364b). But this organic-structural view is not anti-mechanistic; rather, it understands the living 
body in enhanced mechanistic terms: 
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everything leads us to believe that the human body is like the other machines 
which art can assemble, disassemble, and witness in their tiniest springs; it is a 
fact known to any artist, that in even the most complex machines, the entire 
movement rests and bears on one particular piece from which the movement 
began, and from which it spreads to the rest of the machine, producing various 
particular effects in each particular spring. It is only on the condition of such a 
spring in man that we can come to properly know and determine the manner of 
acting of the general causes of life, health, sickness and death (Ménuret de 
Chambaud, 1765, p. 362b). 
Claude Bernard also articulates a twofold vision in which mechanistic and organismic levels are 
intertwined, describing the organism as an “admirable machine” but also a “living machine” 
(Bernard 1865, II, ch. i, §§ iii, vii), with a greater emphasis on self-organization: “[W]hat 
distinguishes a living machine is not the nature of its physico-chemical properties, complex as 
they may be, but rather the creation of the machine which develops under our eyes in 
conditions proper to itself and according to a definite idea which expresses the living being’s 
nature and the very essence of life” (ibid., ch. ii, § 1). 
 
5. 
In this back and forth movement of definitions between living body and machine, 
including multiple degrees and gradations of both, where the mechanical model is ‘frontloaded’ 
with increasingly chemical and biological features, and the models of the living body 
incorporate a variety of mechanistic and structural features, it is hard to distinguish clearly 
between the metaphysical level and what we would today call the scientific level. This is also 
the case when the model takes an existing structure such as the interrelation of organs in the 
living body, and then seeks to describe this interrelation in higher-level terms, as e.g. in the 
Montpellier vitalist way of conceptualizing the components (organs) as so many “little lives,” 
joined together into a single individual ‘Life’ – often expressed in the metaphor or analogy that 
the organism or ‘animal economy’ is like a “beeswarm,” each component of which is already a 
‘life’ of its own (see Wolfe and Terada 2008, § 3, and the introduction to Bouchard and 
Huneman 2013). This combination of levels again illustrates how the concept of organism is a 
porte-manteau concept, on which one hangs various, rather disparate research programs in 
physiology, biomedicine and philosophy. Even if the elaboration of an organism concept can be 
summed up, as Canguilhem does, as “the search, by naturalists, physicians and philosophers, 
for replacements or semantic equivalents for the soul, which could account for the increasingly 
well-established fact of the functional unity of a system of integrated parts” (Canguilhem, 1989, 
p. 551), this does not mean it was a straightforward articulation of a neutral, ‘scientific’ 
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concept. Notably, because it is also a polemical concept, and often one which belongs to a 
revisionary program, sometimes known as ‘organicism’.  
Organicism, in philosophy and in theoretical biology (itself extending work done earlier 
in embryology, physiology, biochemistry and more recently, ecology and evolutionary biology), 
asserts the existence of an irreducible reality of organisms. In the latter discipline, figures such 
as Walter Elsasser in the 1960s, Robert Rosen in the 1980s, and – with a different, often more 
metaphysically oriented program – Francisco Varela between the 1970s and his death in 2001 
sought to formulate ‘laws’ or systemic regularities that would define the organism, often using 
models derived from physics or dynamic systems theory. In the early twentieth century, the 
organicism of Hans Driesch (often termed ‘neovitalism’) lacked such conceptual tools, and 
founded itself on the challenging experimental ‘evidence’ of the equipotentiality of sea urchin 
eggs. As is well known, Driesch gradually left the domain of biological science for that of 
metaphysics, theorizing the ‘entelechies’ that, on his view, explain these properties (Kull, 2013). 
In fact, as I indicated above with the case of Montpellier vitalism, there are both 
historical and conceptual reasons to take such strong (ontological) claims with a grain of salt. 
The type of organism concept which emerges with the montpelliérains is explicitly hostile to any 
appeal to mysterious, non-experimentally (or experientially) based entities, not least because it 
comes out of a medical context, implying a focus on living rather than dead bodies, and on the 
living body as a ‘total’ living system rather than as a parcel of decomposable matter. As 
distinguished from ‘strong organicism’, we could call this concept ‘weak organicism’. For 
instance, the erstwhile Dean of the Montpellier Medical Faculty, Paul-Joseph Barthez, who had 
initially spoken of a vital principle in his 1778 Nouveaux éléments de la science de l’homme, 
added a chapter to this work entitled “Skeptical considerations on the nature of the vital 
principle” in the revised edition, stating “I am as indifferent as can be to ontology considered as 
the science of entities” (Barthez, 1806, p. 96, n. 17). 
Nevertheless, weak organicism is still organicism: notably, it will criticize the 
“mechanists” (in the restrictive sense of those who explain the functioning of the body as if it 
were a machine), not in the name of irreducible holism, but for failing to acknowledge or do 
justice to “the organic structure of the human body, which is the source of its main properties” 
(Ménuret 1765, 364b), by geometrizing it. Bordeu speaks of the mechanical analogies popular 
during the previous hundred years (e.g. in iatromechanism) as “the playthings of our fathers”: 
Spare us, once and for all, all these tiny fibres, pressures, globules, thick 
substances, sharp angles, lymph, hammers and all the rest of the equipment 
from mechanical workshops with which [earlier doctors] filled the living body – 
they were the playthings of our fathers (Bordeu, 1764, in Bordeu, 1818, II, p. 
670). 
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We can read this as just an ironic taking of distance with the obsession in early modern science 
(especially in the mid-to late seventeenth century, the time of Descartes, Borelli but also of the 
Scottish ‘medical Newtonians’ like Pitcairne, whose works read much like Bordeu’s description 
above), or as a stronger, frontal opposition, invoking a kind of ‘essence’ of the organism which 
these mechanistic metaphors cannot grasp. This is not the place to go into detail as to how and 
why I think the eighteenth-century vitalist response to mechanism is more the former than the 
latter, i.e., more a ‘desubstantialized’ argument and rather less a ‘substantial’ ontological 
commitment (for more details see Wolfe and Terada 2008). For present purposes, I claim that 
this supports my distinction between a less essentialist but also less ‘pure’, less monolithic 
concept of organism (the hybrid concept) and a stronger concept. 
Strong organicism, which asserts the intrinsic, objective reality of the organism, is 
diametrically opposed to a Kantian, projective vision, which is not an appeal to an intrinsic 
reality but rather to epistemic features of how we construct the world into intelligible forms. 
This opposition between a strong ontological commitment to the uniqueness of organisms and 
an epistemological theory (which in its own way also insists on their uniqueness), can also be 
nuanced, bearing in mind cases such as Kurt Goldstein’s constructivist approach in his work on 
the ‘organismic’ properties of both our minds and bodies, which emphasizes the inherently 
constructed character of organisms, but also that this constructed character is part of their 
specific dynamic activity, of worldmaking (Goldstein, 1934/1995, Ferrario and Corsi, 2013). 
These approaches, like the standpoint of the Montpellier vitalists discussed above, are non-
substantialist, but in addition, they are specifically constructivist, i.e., organism here is primarily 
emphasized as a meaningful construct, a part of Nature which has been rendered intelligible (or 
meaningful). In Daniel Dennett’s evocative example, if I am being pursued by a tiger in the rain 
forest, I will be better off treating it as an intentional agent (an organism, in the present 
context) rather than as a mere heap of atoms or molecules, as this will enable me to predict its 
behavior better and increase my chances of survival (Dennett, 1987); neither Kant nor 
Goldstein give the idea that our perception is irreducibly organicist, such a Darwinian 
coloration.11 One of the original organicists in the twentieth-century biological sense, Joseph 
Needham, also took this position but from a more ‘total systemic’ standpoint, according to 
which organicism is a stance rather than a theory. For Needham, “all things are organisms and 
all things are atomic systems also. You choose your standpoint,” or in more detail, 
Both [mechanism and vitalism] are co-extensive with experience, but one is 
appropriate to science, the other to philosophy; there is no further need for any 
                                                             
11 It can also be argued, as Wiggins does, that this capacity of organisms to ‘construct the(ir) world’ meaningfully 
has irreducible nomological properties, but that would, again, be a metaphysical claim concerning the nature of 
certain types of substance, rather than an attempt at the ‘historical epistemology’ of the organism as go-between, 
as proposed here. (I thank Adam Ferner for helping me to see this with regard to Wiggins.) 
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fighting to go on in biology between those to whom the concept of organism is 
the more profound and to those who feel the same about that of mechanism, for 
all things are organisms and all things are atomic systems also. You choose your 
standpoint, and you see what is to be seen from that standpoint (Needham, 
1930, pp. 84-86). 
 
 
Conclusion 
 Rather than seeking to articulate an organism concept on a strictly empirical basis 
(including in the ‘organizational’ sense developed in Wolfe, 2010), I have tried to do so by 
insisting on what I have called its hybridity and its status as an ‘ontological go-between’. 
Usually, the concept of hybridity refers to a condition or state (notice how the potential 
dynamism within such a condition will then most likely fade into the background) of impurity, 
whereby there is a co-existence or simultaneous presence within a particular concept, or 
theory, or practice, of various identifiable elements (themselves understood as rather peculiarly 
self-contained), categorizable as ‘naturally’ falling under pre-established, distinct frameworks 
(such as the elements of mechanism within Montpellier vitalism, or of organicism in Cartesian 
accounts of health).12 But here, hybridity simply means that the concept of organism is never 
pure or analytically unresolvable. It is always partly constructed or modified or borrowed from 
elsewhere (including when its functions normatively as legitimization), sometimes invoked as a 
simple natural ‘case’ which buttresses a metaphysics, or on the contrary as a value-laden entity 
which stands against a ‘merely’ physical world (as is also the case, partly, in Kurt Goldstein’s 
theory of organism): always in a process of borrowing.  
If the organism is a hybrid but also a go-between concept – not just a ‘coat of many colors’ 
or a perpetual patchwork, but a robust concept in its way of articulating connections that do not 
always “adhere to the usual stipulations of empirical warrant” (Peterson, 2012) – isn’t it still just a 
construct, since we are not dealing with absolute, isolable entities or states of being? I have 
suggested at least two reasons why not.  
One is that there are definitely more ways to study the materiality of worms and wombats, 
but also slime molds, coral reefs and giant fungi, than just as metaphors, given that “within an 
overall field of science, there may be variation regarding the epistemic goal(s) pursued by a term’s 
use” (Brigandt, 2010, p. 23). That is, the individuation of a concept – here, organism – can be 
based on different properties, including its reference and its ‘epistemic goal’ (p. 25). The epistemic 
goal here is a necessary component of any philosophical framework that wants to explain 
                                                             
12 I thank Claudia Alexandra Manta for this point. 
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conceptual change. A merely referential criterion won’t be sufficient, (a) because it runs the risk of 
confusing the empirical and the metaphysical, in my terms; (b) because Aristotle’s, Jonas’s or 
Ruyer’s referential criteria for organism might not match up with, e.g., Godfrey-Smith’s ‘squibrio’ 
described below. The hybridity feature in my analysis implies that the variable, instrumentalist 
dimension is not ‘merely instrumental’ as in the instrumentalism-realism opposition. Nor is it just a 
matter of the fruitfulness of ‘travelling concepts’ (Bal), or the diversity of possible standpoints à la 
Needham, but rather a hybrid reality, as I discuss below. 
Another is that these are individual substances, even if their boundaries are not always 
clear or matching up to our common intuitions of what an individual would be (Bouchard and 
Huneman, eds., 2013); to take one example, “the omnipresence of symbiosis should be seen as 
undermining the project of dividing living systems unequivocally into unique organisms” 
(Dupré, 2012, p. 8). There are also cases in which symbiotic individuals are not what Godfrey-
Smith recently called ‘Darwinian individuals’, as they do not form parent-offspring lineages, 
such as the symbiosis discussed by Godfrey-Smith between the Hawaiian bobtail squid 
(Euprymna scolopes) and the bacteria Vibrio fischeri, which grow into colonies in specialized 
‘crypts’ inside the squid, which form part of the squid's ‘light organ’; he suggests calling the 
squid-Vibrio combination a ‘squibrio’.13 Of course, I am not seeking to reintroduce an 
‘Aristotelian’ concept of organisms as paradigmatic individuals through the back door. After all, 
it would seem difficult for a hybrid concept to also be a paradigmatic individual. This is why I 
have insisted on hybridity as matching up with a weakly ontological concept, in the sense that 
in-between or non-traditional cases such as termite mounds with their homeostatic properties, 
bacteria, coral reefs and ‘squibrios’ challenge our monolithic intuitions about the individuality 
of organisms yet at the same time emphasize the materiality of the concept, something not to 
be dispensed with or reduced to a merely instrumental status. Degrees of organismality are 
real! 
While some might take this talk of ‘degrees’, of shifts, of borrowings and displacements 
between the empirical and the metaphysical, or between different scientific areas, as an 
indicator of the emptiness of the organism concept, of its outdated character (in favor of a 
“nothing but atoms or molecules” view, sensu Hull positively and Ruyer negatively, or of a 
provisional view as in the standard instrumentalist sense), and others might balk at any 
reference to ontology and opt for a strictly epistemological view (Keller) or an insistence that 
we are dealing with metaphors and nothing more, my suggestion is that the hybridity of the 
                                                             
13 “This light organ lights up in a way that provides camouflage from predators watching from below, as it prevents 
the squid from casting a shadow. This shadow would be cast by moonlight – the squid hunts at night. At the dawn 
of each day, most of the bacteria are expelled, and the colony regrows from the remainder while the squid hides 
on the sea floor. It can be argued that the squid-Vibrio combination is the organism (perhaps a ‘squibrio’)” 
(Godfrey-Smith, 2013, p. 29).  
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organism concept – the way that mechanistic concepts of body (e.g. Cartesian physiology) are 
not without embodied, organismic properties, just as vitalistic concepts of, e.g. the animal 
economy are not without mechanistic specifiable features, along with later examples including 
Claude Bernard’s ‘living machine’, so that the concept is never pure or analytically unresolvable 
– also presupposes a degree of reality, which is built on the historical and scientific variety of 
organism models and definitions: a kind of meta-instrumentalism. What I have described as 
hybridity and go-betweenness at the conceptual level can of course also be studied in the 
materiality of scientific apparatuses, as Hans-Jörg Rheinberger has done influentially: 
“Conjunctures, hybridizations, and bifurcations basically describe types of shifts, linkages, and 
descents through which the dynamics of reorientation, fusion, and proliferation of particular 
experimental systems is made possible” (Rheinberger, 1997b, p. 250). Rheinberger additionally 
emphasizes a cognitive, constructed level of the effectivity of scientific practices: his 
experimental systems do not just inhabit a world of ‘things’ but also, what he calls 
“graphematic spaces,” capable of “differential reproduction” (Rheinberger 1998, p. 287); 
indeed he also speaks of “epistemic practices” as being “hybrids” that can be classified as either 
theoretical or practical (ibid., p. 286). 
The reality of the organism concept in this sense is partly correlated with the emergence 
of biology as a science, even if biologists and philosophers have observed more recently (Jacob, 
1970; Keller, 2003; Machery, 2012) that there is no need for biology to have ‘life’ or any other 
sharply defined concept at its center; if, that is, “Biology has developed as a discipline without 
having anything terribly precise to say about exactly what its domain of inquiry is,” so that 
“perhaps ‘alive’ is not a crisply delimited category in nature” (Sober, 2003, p. 318). What we 
have, then, is a weakly ontological organism concept, as some biologists call for: not as an 
umbrella concept to organize all of some kind of reconceived ‘organismic’ biology, nor as a 
reactive concept against ‘mechanistic’ or ‘reductionist’ science, but simply as a way of doing 
justice to certain kinds of systems, as Scott Turner has insisted, among others. This is similar to 
Gilbert and Sarkar’s analysis of various trends in recent biology that share a common opposition 
to genocentrism: they aim to reconstruct an approach to specific forms of organization – not 
the naïve metaphysics of arrangements of matter plus an immaterial Bildungskraft, nisus 
formativus or an otherwise specified ‘life-force’ (Gilbert and Sarkar, 2000). Thereby, despite 
having frequently been pronounced ‘caduc’, irrelevant, reduced to molecules or genes, the 
concept of organism retains a productivity – nomadic but thereby real. Yet this perpetuation is 
far removed from any ‘metaphysics of organism’, or old-fashioned organismic biology.  
Rather than an essence of organism or a substantialist theory (selfhood, subjectivity, 
personhood, continuity, etc.), it is characterized by its go-betweenness or nomadism, itself 
reminiscent of notions such as “boundary concepts” or “trading zones”; to borrow a term from 
Rheinberger, who applied it to the admittedly deliberate constructs he names “epistemic things,” 
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the organism is a “joker” (Rheinberger, 1997b, p. 246), not in the sense that it is humorous, but 
rather that it is like the card which can play different roles within a given card game. If certain 
conceptual constructs are jokers for the world of practice (e.g., when the Kantian whole:parts 
conception of organism is used in early nineteenth-century German developmental biology: 
Huneman, 2014), conversely, certain material-conceptual constructs are also jokers for the world 
of biological theory (as in the way Hans Driesch turns his experimentally founded work on the 
regenerative potential of sea urchin embryos into a metaphysics of ‘entelechies’; Kull, 2013, or 
Hans Jonas’ transformation of the biological ‘fact’ of homeostasis into a basis for a revisionary, 
anti-Cartesian metaphysics of life). As I’ve shown in some select cases (others might focus more on 
Kant or systems biology (Toepfer, 2013)), the historian and the philosopher of biology might 
benefit from paying some attention to the organism concept, whether out of interest in 
individuality and organization, in the pertinence of hybrid concepts in the history and philosophy 
of science, or more generally in the emergence of the science of biology. 
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